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Preparedness of Hospitals in the Republic
of Ireland for an Influenza Pandemic, an
Infection Control Perspective
Mary Reidy1*, Fiona Ryan2, Dervla Hogan3, Sean Lacey3 and Claire Buckley4
Abstract
Background: When an influenza pandemic occurs most of the population is susceptible and attack rates can range
as high as 40–50 %. The most important failure in pandemic planning is the lack of standards or guidelines
regarding what it means to be ‘prepared’. The aim of this study was to assess the preparedness of acute hospitals
in the Republic of Ireland for an influenza pandemic from an infection control perspective.
Methods: This was a cross sectional study involving a questionnaire completed by infection control nurses, time
period from June – July 2013, (3 weeks) from acute public and private hospitals in the Republic of Ireland. A total of
46 out of 56 hospitals responded to the questionnaire.
Results: From a sample of 46 Irish hospitals, it was found that Irish hospitals are not fully prepared for an influenza
pandemic despite the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. In 2013, thirty five per cent of Irish hospitals have
participated in an emergency plan or infectious disease exercise and have plans or been involved in local planning
efforts to care for patients at non-health care facilities. Sixty per cent of Irish hospitals did not compile or did not
know if the hospital had compiled a “lessons learned” from any exercise that were then used to revise emergency
response plans. Fifty two per cent of hospitals have sufficient airborne isolation capacity to address routine needs
and have an interim emergency plan to address needs during an outbreak. Fifty one percent of hospitals have
taken specific measures to stockpile or have reserve medical supplies e.g. masks, ventilators and linen.
Conclusions: This is the first study carried out in the Republic of Ireland investigating the current preparedness for
an influenza pandemic from an infection control perspective.
Deficits exist in the provision of emergency planning committees, testing of emergency plans, airborne isolation
facilities, stockpiling of personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies and organisational schemes/
incentives for healthcare workers to continue to work in a pandemic. While Irish standards are comparable to
findings from international studies, the health care service needs to continue to enhance preparedness for an
influenza pandemic and implement standard preparedness guidance for all Irish hospitals.
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Background
The historical degree of antigenic natural process and oc-
currence of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus
strains shows that mutations in the future cannot be fore-
seen [1]. Due to the growth in global transport and
urbanization, epidemics caused by a new influenza virus
are likely to spread rapidly around the world [2]. Influenza
pandemics occur sporadically and most of the population
is susceptible so that attack rates can range as high as 40–
50 % of the population [3].
The objective of pandemic planning is to assist countries
to be prepared to recognise and manage an influenza
pandemic. Planning can minimise the spread of the pan-
demic virus, decrease cases, hospitalisations and deaths,
preserve essential services and mitigate the economic and
social aftermaths of a pandemic [4].
Hospital emergency management plans are a vital elem-
ent of hospital preparedness for magnitude casualties and
need to tackle all key risks including biologic threats such
as bioterrorism, emerging infectious diseases, outbreaks
and pandemics [5]. The key failure in pandemic planning
is the lack of standards or guidelines regarding what it
means to be ‘prepared’ [6].
International studies reported similar findings to each
other regarding infectious disease disaster preparedness.
Hospitals had inadequate interaction and accounting pro-
cedures, poor healthcare worker training programs and in-
adequate stockpiled personal protective equipment and
other medical equipment e.g. ventilators [5–8]. These
studies highlighted deficient 24 h infection control re-
sources, lack of preparedness for an increase in the need
for negative-pressure facilities and failure of healthcare
workers (HCWs) to participate in hospital pandemic pre-
paredness drills which involved an infectious disease sce-
nario along with lack of prioritization strategies for
distribution of restricted doses of antiviral medications
[5, 9–11]. Hospitals require more preparedness for infec-
tious disease outbreaks and hospitals have not focused on
testing their plans despite the evidence that preparedness is
key during a pandemic [5, 10, 12, 13]. Smaller hospitals
(≤99 beds) are less prepared than larger hospitals with
regards to surge capacity [14]. The consistent recommen-
dations from these studies are that hospitals need to con-
tinue to prepare and test their preparedness for an
influenza pandemic. In comparison to similar studies, these
authors used different audit tools in order to assess the level
of preparedness for an influenza pandemic (no audit tool
the same). There is no checklist currently in Ireland for
Irish hospitals to assess how prepared they are for an influ-
enza pandemic, not included in the Irish guidance for an
influenza pandemic. The Centre of Diseases Control and
Prevention (CDC) has a check list which assists hospitals to
assess their preparedness which is not included in the Irish
pandemics preparedness as a tool to assist hospitals.
The aim of this study was to assess the prepared-
ness of acute hospitals in the Republic of Ireland for
an influenza pandemic from an infection control
perspective.
Methods
This is a cross-sectional study using a questionnaire
completed by infection control nurses. The participant
information sheet and a letter outlining the study
requesting permission to carry out the research was sent
to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Manager of each
hospital. An e-mail was sent to the infection prevention
control nurse (IPCN) of each hospital outlining the
study and objectives of same, inclusion and exclusion
criteria were applied as follows: Acute public and pri-
vate hospitals in the Republic of Ireland were included.
Nursing Homes and Psychiatric hospitals were ex-
cluded. The list of acute public and private hospitals
was compiled from the Health Service Executive web
site and the Health Protective Surveillance Centre sur-
veillance scientist who collates data for the National
Clostridium Difficile Associated Disease surveillance in
the Republic of Ireland.
Questionnaire Design/Data Collection Method
There is no checklist currently in Ireland for Irish
hospitals to assess how prepared they are for an in-
fluenza pandemic, not included in the Irish guidance
for an influenza pandemic. The Centre for Disease
Control provides a checklist in order for hospitals to
assess their preparedness for an influenza pandemic.
International studies were cross sectional studies
using questionnaires, no questionnaire was similar.
The author adapted the questionnaire by Rebmann
(2009b), examining the knowledge of infection con-
trol nurses of their hospitals preparedness for an in-
fluenza pandemic using a quantitative study design.
The researcher used this questionnaire for the study
with permission from the author Rebmann. Prior to
piloting the questionnaire, it was edited using English
terminology rather than Americanized versions. The
name of the hospital was sought in order for follow-
up phone calls to hospitals to fill in blank answers.
This questionnaire was modified and piloted by
IPCNs in three hospitals. No modifications were re-
quired following their evaluation. The questionnaire
included 42 questions to be answered. This question-
naire allowed hospitals to give comments on the best
and worst aspects of their hospitals preparedness for
an influenza pandemic which was analysed descrip-
tively. Open ended questions were included in the
questionnaire; these comments will be reviewed in
further research.
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The questionnaire contained 42 questions. The domains
evaluated in the questionnaire included the following:
1. Pandemic emergency preparedness
2. Airborne isolation
3. Staffing
4. Vaccines administration to healthcare workers (HCW's)
5. Stockpile of supplies.
The name of each hospital was sought in order for
follow-up phone calls to hospitals to fill in blank answers.
The questionnaire contained a number of ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or
'Don't know' style questions and also allowed IPCNs to
give comments. Consent was obtained when survey com-
pleted by each IPCN and returned to author. Time period
to sending out questionnaires and receiving responses was
from June – July 2013, (3 weeks) from acute public and
private hospitals in the Republic of Ireland. A total of 46
out of 56 hospitals responded to the questionnaire
The statistical computer package IBM SPSS, Version 22
was used to perform quantitative analysis on the collected
data. In order to perform analysis of data, it was necessary
to code the response variables i.e., yes = 1, no = 0, don't
know = blank. Data cleaning was carried out throughout
the data entry process. Analysis of the data was performed
through descriptive statistics, such as frequencies for each
of the variables. Contingency tables were used to de-
scribe the relationship between question responses.
A chi-squared test for association was used to determine
whether or not any associations observed were statistically
significant (p ≤ 0.05). Hospital size categories were se-
lected from arbitrary, no existing hospital classification
in use in Ireland. Hospital sizing involved the following:
Small <100 beds (8 hospitals responded)
Medium 100–199 beds (18 hospitals responded)
Large >199 beds (20 hospitals responded)
Contingency tables were used to describe the relation-
ship between question responses. A chi-squared test for
association was used to determine whether or not any as-
sociations observed were statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05).
Ethics
Ethical approval was granted by the Clinical Research
Committee of the Cork Teaching Hospitals (public hospi-
tals) and the Bon Secours Group Ethics Committee (pri-
vate hospitals) in Ireland.
Results
The response rate was 85 %; 46 out of 56 acute public
and private hospitals completed the questionnaire. Re-
sponse rate is broken down further by the following:
small sized hospitals <100 beds (8 responses), medium
sized hospitals 100–199 beds (18 responses) and large
sized hospitals >199 beds (20 responses) see Table 1 on
the break down of results.
1. Pandemic emergency preparedness:
Eighty five percent (n = 39) of hospitals have an emer-
gency planning committee and of those hospitals that
have a committee, seventy nine per cent include in
their scope planning for an influenza pandemic (see
Table 2). Smaller hospitals were significantly less likely to
have an emergency planning committee (p = .045). Sixty
seven per cent (n = 31) of emergency planning committees
include planning for influenza pandemic (see Table 3).
There was no statistical association found between
whether or not emergency planning committees include
planning for influenza pandemic and hospital size (p =
0.972). The highest result of seventy two per cent (n = 13)
accounts for medium sized hospitals, with a similar result
of sixty two per cent (n = 5) for small and sixty five per
cent (n = 13) for large hospitals.
Thirty five per cent (n = 16) of hospitals have partici-
pated in an emergency plan or infectious disease exercise
in the past twelve months (see Table 4). The majority of
hospitals (56.5 %) (n = 26) have not participated in an
emergency plan or infectious disease exercise in the last
12 months (p < 0.001). A minority (17.6 % (n = 6)) of hos-
pitals involved community participation when conducting
an emergency plan (p = 0.037).
Fifteen per cent (n = 5) of hospitals involved com-
munity participation when conducting an emergency
plan. Forty per cent (n = 15) of hospitals compiled
lessons learned from emergency exercises carried
out. Thirty six per cent (n = 16) of hospitals edu-
cated staff on revisions made to emergency response
plans. Thirty per cent (n = 13) of emergency plans
included a surge capacity plan to incorporate add-
itional staffing resources.
Only thirty per cent (n = 14) of hospitals have plans
or been involved in local planning efforts to care for
patients at non-health care facilities (p = 0.001, see
Table 5). While twenty two per cent (n = 10) of hospi-
tals have incentives to encourage HCWs to continue
to come to work in the event of a major infectious
disease outbreak/disaster (p < 0.001).
2. Airborne isolation capabilities
From Table 6, fifty two per cent (n = 24) of hospitals
have enough airborne isolation capabilities and capacity
(in terms of rooms or areas) to meet their current rou-
tine needs.
Fifty four per cent (n = 25) of hospitals have an interim
emergency plan for addressing airborne isolation capacity
for an outbreak of prolonged airborne-spread disease to
safely house patients on an emergency temporary basis.
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Table 1 Break down of results on Preparedness of Hospitals in the Republic of Ireland for an Influenza Pandemic, an Infection
Control Perspective
Pandemic emergency preparedness Small hospitals
compliance
Medium hospitals
compliance
Large
hospitals
Total percentage
compliance
Total number
of hospitals
Existence of emergency planning committee 50 % (n = 4) 94 % (n = 17) 90 % (n = 18) 85 % (n = 39) 39
Hospitals with an emergency planning committee,
percentage of committees which included in their
scope planning for an influenza pandemic
79 % 36
Percentage of emergency planning committees
which include planning for influenza pandemic
62 % (n = 5) 72 % (n = 13) 65 % (n = 13) 67 % 31
Percentage of hospitals which participated in an emergency
plan or infectious disease exercise in the past 12 months
25 % (n = 2) 40 % (n = 7) 35 % (n = 16) 35 % 16
Percentage of hospitals which involve community
participation when conducting an emergency plan
15 % 5
Percentage of hospitals who compiled lessons learnt
from emergency exercises carried out
40 % 15
Percentage of hospitals who educated staff on revisions
made to emergency response plans
36 % 16
Percentage of emergency plans which include a surge
capacity plan to incorporate additional staffing resources
12.5 % (n = 1) 29 % (n = 5) 37 % (n = 7) 30 % 13
Percentage of hospitals who have plans or been involved in local
planning efforts to care for patients at non-health care facilities
30 % 14
Percentage of hospitals who have incentives to encourage
HCW’s to continue to come to work in the event of a
major infectious disease outbreak/disaster
25 % (n = 2) 22 % (n = 4) 20 % (n = 4) 22 % 10
Airborne isolation
Percentage of hospitals who have enough airborne
isolation capabilities and capacity to meet current needs
62 % (n = 5) 50 % (n = 9) 50 % (n = 10) 52 % 24
Percentage of hospitals who have an interim emergency
plan for addressing airborne isolation capacity for an
outbreak of prolonged airborne-spread disease to
safely house patients on an emergency temporary basis
12 % (n = 1) 72 % (n = 13) 55 % (n = 11) 54 % 25
Percentage of hospitals who have sufficient plans to safely house
patients during a major airborne-spread disease outbreak
12 % (n = 1) 41 % (n = 7) 45 % (n = 9) 38 % 17
Staffing
Percentage of hospitals who have cross trained staff to
treat an influx of influenza patients
12 % (n = 1) 28 % (n = 5) 15 % (n = 3) 26 % 12
Percentage of hospitals who have cross-trained staff to
provide patient care outside their routine area or speciality
12 % (n = 1) 28 % (n = 5) 15 % (n = 3) 20 % 9
Percentage of hospitals who have developed policies or
procedures to provide altered standards of care during a pandemic
35 % 16
Percentage of hospitals who have plans for instituting
a ‘working quarantine’ for staff
20 % 9
Vaccine administration
Percentages of hospitals who have a plan to prioritise hospital
workers to receive vaccines in the event of an infectious emergency
65 % 30
Stockpile of supplies
Percentage of hospital who have taken measures to
stockpile linen, gowns, masks and other supplies
12 % (n = 1) 72 % (n = 13) 47 % (n = 9) 51 % 23
Existence of emergency planning committee 50 % (n = 4) 94 % (n = 17) 90 % (n = 18) 85 % (n = 39) 39
Hospitals with an emergency planning committee,
percentage of committees which included in their
scope planning for an influenza pandemic
79 % 36
Percentage of emergency planning committees
which include planning for influenza pandemic
62 % (n = 5) 72 % (n = 13) 65 % (n = 13) 67 % 31
Reidy et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:847 Page 4 of 9
From Table 7, twelve and a half per cent (n = 1) of
smaller hospitals and fifty five per cent (n = 11) of lar-
ger sized hospitals have an interim emergency plan
compared to seventy two percent (n = 13) of medium
sized hospitals.
Thirty eight per cent (n = 17) of hospitals have sufficient
plans to safely house patients during a major airborne-
spread disease outbreak (Table 8, p = 0.074).
Table 1 Break down of results on Preparedness of Hospitals in the Republic of Ireland for an Influenza Pandemic, an Infection
Control Perspective (Continued)
Percentage of hospitals which participated in an emergency
plan or infectious disease exercise in the past 12 months
25 % (n = 2) 40 % (n = 7) 35 % (n = 16) 35 % 16
Percentage of hospitals which involve community participation
when conducting an emergency plan
15 % 5
Percentage of hospitals who compiled lessons learnt from
emergency exercises carried out
40 % 15
Percentage of hospitals who educated staff on revisions
made to emergency response plans
36 % 16
Percentage of emergency plans which include a surge capacity
plan to incorporate additional staffing resources
12.5 % (n = 1) 29 % (n = 5) 37 % (n = 7) 30 % 13
Percentage of hospitals who have plans or been involved in
local planning efforts to care for patients at non-health care
facilities
30 % 14
Percentage of hospitals who have incentives to encourage
HCW’s to continue to come to work in the event of a
major infectious disease outbreak/disaster
25 % (n = 2) 22 % (n = 4) 20 % (n = 4) 22 % 10
Airborne isolation
Percentage of hospitals who have enough airborne isolation
capabilities and capacity to meet current needs
62 % (n = 5) 50 % (n = 9) 50 % (n = 10) 52 % 24
Percentage of hospitals who have an interim emergency
plan for addressing airborne isolation capacity for an outbreak
of prolonged airborne-spread disease to safely house patients
on an emergency temporary basis
12 % (n = 1) 72 % (n = 13) 55 % (n = 11) 54 % 25
Percentage of hospitals who have sufficient plans to safely
house patients during a major airborne-spread disease
outbreak
12 % (n = 1) 41 % (n = 7) 45 % (n = 9) 38 % 17
Staffing
Percentage of hospitals who have cross trained staff to
treat an influx of influenza patients
12 % (n = 1) 28 % (n = 5) 15 % (n = 3) 26 % 12
Percentage of hospitals who have cross-trained staff to
provide patient care outside their routine area or speciality
12 % (n = 1) 28 % (n = 5) 15 % (n = 3) 20 % 9
Percentage of hospitals who have developed policies or
procedures to provide altered standards of care during
a pandemic
35 % 16
Percentage of hospitals who have plans for instituting
a ‘working quarantine’ for staff
20 % 9
Vaccine administration
Percentages of hospitals who have a plan to prioritise
hospital workers to receive vaccines in the event
of an infectious emergency
65 % 30
Stockpile of supplies
Percentage of hospital who have taken measures
to stockpile linen, gowns, masks and other supplies
12 % (n = 1) 72 % (n = 13) 47 % (n = 9) 51 % 23
Table 2 Contingency table of hospital size with emergency
planning committee
Does the hospital have an
emergency planning committee?
Total
Yes No Don't know
Hospital
size
<100 4 (50.0 %) 3 (37.5 %) 1 (12.5 %) 8 (100.0 %)
100-199 17 (94.4 %) 1 (5.6 %) 0 (0.0 %) 18 (100.0 %)
>199 18 (90.0 %) 1 (5.0 %) 1 (5.0 %) 20 (100.0 %)
Total 39 (84.8 %) 5 (10.9 %) 2 (4.3 %) 46 (100.0 %)
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3. Staffing
Low levels of cross-training (twenty six percent, (n = 12))
to treat an influx of influenza patients was reported
overall (see Table 9, p < 0.001).
Twenty per cent of (n = 9) hospitals have cross-trained
staff to provide patient care outside their routine area or
speciality (Table 9, p < 0.001). Fifty per cent (n = 25) of
hospitals have plans during a pandemic influenza out-
break to have designated staff limited to treat either in-
fluenza or non-influenza patients (Table 9, p = 0.015).
Thirty five per cent (n = 13) of hospitals have developed
policies or procedures to provide altered standards of
care during a pandemic (Table 9, p = 0.005).
Twenty per cent (n = 16) of hospitals have plans for
instituting a “working quarantine” for staff (Table 9,
p < 0.001). All hospitals surveyed had an infection
control nurse and the average number of nurses by
weighted time equivalent per hospital was 1.78.
Seventy six per cent of hospitals have an infection
control professional available for immediate (within
fifteen minutes) verbal consultation.
4. Vaccine administration
Sixty five per cent (n = 30) of hospitals have a plan to
prioritise hospital workers to receive vaccines in the
event of an infectious emergency (Table 10, p < 0.001).
Only two hospitals included HCWs family members to
be part of the hospitals prioritisation plan for receiving
vaccine or anti-infective therapy in the event of an infec-
tious disease emergency Table 10, p <0.001).
5. Stockpile of supplies
Fifty one per cent (n = 23) of hospitals have taken
measures to stockpile linen, gowns, masks and other
supplies, (see Table 11).
Discussion
The main findings from this study showed hospitals
are not fully prepared from an infection control per-
spective for an influenza pandemic.
1. Pandemic emergency preparedness
Our results revealed 85 % of Irish hospitals had an emer-
gency planning committee and 67 % of such committees
included planning for an influenza pandemic. There is a
statistically significant association between hospital size
and the existence of an emergency planning committee
i.e. 50 % of smaller hospitals (<100 beds) have emergency
planning committees compared to >90 % of medium
and larger hospitals surveyed. Chinese findings were
similar [12] where 85 % of hospitals had an emergency
planning committee while 79 % included in their scope
planning for an influenza pandemic in comparison to
findings from a Chinese study which demonstrated a
higher result of 93 %.
One third of Irish hospitals had participated in an
emergency plan or infectious disease exercise in the last
year in comparison to Canadian findings [13] which
showed a higher result of 84.5 % of hospitals had tested
their plans while Chinese studies [12] demonstrated
55 % of hospitals had evaluated and reviewed their
emergency plan at least once and a similar result of
84 % of carrying out an infectious disease scenario in
the previous year [14].
Irish hospitals demonstrated a low level of including
community participation of 15 % in comparison to a
rate of 86.5 % from America findings [14].
Noteworthy that only 60 % of respondents did not
compile or did not know if the hospital had compiled a
“lessons learned” from any exercise that were then used
to revise emergency response plans while 85 % of
American hospitals had compiled lessons learned from
the exercise that was used to revise their emergency
Table 3 Contingency table of hospital size with planning for
influenza pandemic
Does emergency planning
committees include planning
for influenza pandemic?
Total
Yes No Don't
know
Hospital
size
<100 5 (62.5 %) 2 (25.0 %) 1 (12.5 %) 8 (100.0 %)
100-199 13 (72.2 %) 4 (22.2 %) 1 (5.6 %) 18 (100.0 %)
>199 13 (65.0 %) 5 (25.0 %) 2 (10.0 %) 20 (100.0 %)
Total 31 (67.4 %) 11 (23.9 %) 4 (8.7 %) 46 (100.0 %)
Table 4 Contingency table of hospital participation
Response Participated in an emergency plan or infectious
disease exercise in the past 12 months
Community
participation
Compiled
lessons learned
Educated/trained
on revisions
Emergency plan include
a surge capacity plan
Yes 16 (34.8 %) 6 (17.6 %) 16 (41.0 %) 16 (35.6 %) 13 (29.5 %)
No 26 (56.5 %) 10 (29.4 %) 15 (38.5 %) 21 (46.7 %) 18 (40.9 %)
Don't know 4 (8.7 %) 18 (52.9 %) 8 (20.5 %) 8 (17.8 %) 13 (29.5 %)
Total 46 (100.0 %) 34 (100.0 %) 39 (100.0 %) 45 (100.0 %) 44 (100.0 %)
p-value <0.001 0.037 0.232 0.057 0.567
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plan [14]. Hospital emergency plans should be updated
regularly based on lessons learned from exercises [8].
2. Airborne isolation Capabilities
Over half of Irish hospitals had enough airborne iso-
lation capabilities and capacity to meet the current
routine needs (one per 150 acute inpatient beds, or
one per 75 acute inpatient beds for regional or ter-
tiary hospitals SARI 2009) compared to 85 % of
American hospitals reported that their hospital has
sufficient numbers of negative-pressure rooms to ac-
commodate their current isolation needs [14]. Only
55 % of Irish hospitals have an interim emergency
plan to address needs during an outbreak.
Significantly, only 38 % of Irish hospitals have suffi-
cient plans to safely house patients during a major
airborne disease outbreak and 54 % had an interim
emergency plan for addressing airborne isolation cap-
acity for an outbreak of prolonged airborne -spread
disease to safely house patients on an emergency tem-
porary basis [14].
3. Staffing
Only 26 % of Irish hospitals have cross-trained staff
to be able to treat an influx of influenza patients
while 22 % have cross-trained staff to provide patient
care outside their routine area or speciality compared to a
similar study of 24.6 % showing similar results [14].
4. Vaccines
Sixty-five percent of Irish hospitals have a plan to pri-
oritise hospital workers to receive vaccines in the
event of an infectious emergency. In regards to inter-
national studies there is no comparison to vaccines.
This low reported percentage may be due to IPCNs
not having the information as occupational health
nurses would normally be responsible for vaccines.
5. Stockpile of supplies
The emergency plan should include protocols for
stockpiling or obtaining additional staff, medical and
laboratory equipment supplies [14] whilst stockpiling a
sufficient amount of PPE could be a large financial
burden on each hospital; this must occur before pan-
demics escalate due to the inevitable shortage of PPE
[15]. There is a statistically significant association be-
tween hospital size and taking measures to stockpile or
have reserve medical supplies (p = 0.026). The Health
Service holds a stockpile of supplies which is given to
hospitals during a pandemic. Medium sized hospitals
are better prepared than smaller and larger sized
hospitals.
Less than half of hospitals have stockpiled or worked
with the HSE to establish a stockpile of FFP2/FFP3 respi-
rators (average of 6 days) compared to 67 % of American
hospitals stockpiling N95 respirators [14].
Table 5 Contingency table of hospitals involved in local
planning and staff incentives
Response Established plans or been
involved in local planning
efforts to care for a patients at
non-health care facilities
Incentives to encourage
HCWs to continue to come
to work in the event of a
major infectious disease
outbreak/disaster
Yes 14 (30.4 %) 10 (21.7 %)
No 26 (56.5 %) 30 (65.2 %)
Don't
know
6 (13.0 %) 6 (13.0 %)
Total 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %)
p-value 0.001 <0.001
Table 6 Contingency table of hospitals having sufficient and
preparation for isolation
Enough airborne isolation
capabilities and capacity
Interim emergency plan for
addressing airborne isolation capacity
Yes 24 (52.2 %) 25 (54.3 %)
No 22 (47.8 %) 14 (30.4 %)
Don't
know
0 (0.0 %) 7 (15.2 %)
Total 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %)
p-value 0.883 0.005
Table 7 Contingency table of hospital size and interim
emergency airborne isolation capacity
Interim emergency plan for
addressing airborne isolation capacity
Total
Yes No Don't know
Hospital
size
<100 1 (12.5 %) 5 (62.5 %) 2 (25.0 %) 8 (100.0 %)
100-199 13 (72.2 %) 4 (22.2 %) 1 (5.6 %) 18 (100.0 %)
>199 11 (55.0 %) 5 (25.0 %) 4 (20.0 %) 20 (100.0 %)
Total 25 (54.3 %) 14 (30.4 %) 7 (15.2 %) 46 (100.0 %)
Table 8 Contingency table to house patients during major
airborne disease outbreak
Sufficient plans to safely house patients during
a major airborne-spread disease outbreak
Frequency Percent
Yes 17 37.8
No 20 44.4
Don't know 8 17.8
Total 45 100.0
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One third of hospitals have stockpiled surgical masks
(average of 5.1 days supply) compared to 46 % of American
findings [14].
One fifth of hospitals have stockpiled or worked with
the state to establish a stockpile of linen (average of 2.4
days supply of linen) compared to a demonstration of a
higher rate of half of US hospitals indicated they had
enough linen for <5 days [14].
Overall these findings are evidence for the need for
greater prioritisation of pandemic preparedness stockpiling.
Strengths of study
Forty six hospitals out of a total of 56 acute public and
private hospitals in the Republic of Ireland completed
the questionnaire yielding a response rate of 82 %. This
was a good response rate in comparison to the literature
review studies; ranging from 20 % [14] – 88.2 % [13].
Limitations
There may have been responder bias as IPCNs com-
pleted the survey, may have focussed on strengths. Stan-
dardised validated questionnaire was not used however,
previously used questionnaires were adapted and piloted
prior to use. Information was limited by IPCN's as some
had the information themselves due to being a member
of the emergency committee, some IPCN's went to lead
persons to gain answers to the questionnaire while
others did not have all the information. Ten hospitals
did not respond, all private hospitals responded. No
reason given for not responding. Analysis was not done
in regards to levels of preparedness by private and public
hospitals. The question was not posed if hospitals were
using a checklist in order to assess their preparedness
e.g. Centre for Disease Control guidance.
Conclusion
This is the first study in the Republic of Ireland investi-
gating preparedness of Irish acute hospitals for an influ-
enza pandemic from an infection control perspective,
acute hospitals in the Republic of Ireland have deficits
regarding emergency planning committees, testing of
emergency plans, airborne isolation facilities and incen-
tives to encourage HCW’s to come to work in line with
the literature. The Republic of Ireland needs to address
gaps in influenza pandemic preparedness.
Recommendations
Hospitals should prepare and regularly test their pre-
paredness for an influenza pandemic using the standar-
dised recognised tools.
There should be national agreement on the use of a
standardised internationally recognised tool to be used
in all acute hospitals for this purpose.
The overarching recommendation is the need for a
strategic approach to pandemic preparedness and ele-
ments of this research could be used to inform health
policy in the Republic of Ireland.
Table 9 Contingency table re staffing preparedness
Response Cross-training to treat
an influx of influenza
patients
Cross-trained staff to
provide patient care
outside their routine area
Plans for having designated staff
limited to treat either influenza
or non-influenza patients
Developed
policies/procedures
Plans for instituting
"working quarantine"
for staff
Yes 12 (26.1 %) 9 (19.6 %) 23 (50.0 %) 16 (34.8 %) 10 (21.7 %)
No 30 (65.2 %) 31 (67.4 %) 16 (34.8 %) 24 (52.2 %) 27 (57.7 %)
Don't know 4 (8.7 %) 6 (13.0 %) 7 (15.2 %) 6 (13.0 %) 9 (19.6 %)
Total 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %) 46 (100.0 %)
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.015 0.005 0.001
Table 10 Contingency table vaccines and healthcare workers
Response Prioritise hospital workers
to receive vaccines in
the event of an
infectious emergency
Included HCWs family
members to be part
of the hospitals
prioritisation plan
Yes 30 (65.2 %) 2 (5.7 %)
No 7 (15.2 %) 27 (77.1 %)
Don't know 9 (19.6 %) 6 (17.1 %)
Total 46 (100.0 %) 35 (100.0 %)
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Table 11 Contingency table of hospital size with measures of
stockpile
Measures to stockpile Total
Yes No Don't know
Hospital
size
<100 1 (12.5 %) 5 (62.5 %) 2 (25.0 %) 8 (100.0 %)
100-199 13 (72.2 %) 5 (27.8 %) 0 (0.0 %) 18 (100.0 %)
>199 9 (47.4 %) 9 (47.4 %) 1 (5.3 %) 19 (100.0 %)
Total 23 (51.1 %) 19 (42.2 %) 3 (6.7 %) 45 (100.0 %)
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